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This paper examines macroprudential policies in open emerging economies. It 
discusses how the recent financial crisis has provided a rationale for macroprudential 
policies to help manage the economy and the need for policymakers to monitor 
the financial cycle and systemic risks. It also discusses one particularly promising 
measure of the state of the financial cycle, the growth of noncore liabilities of the 
financial sector, and evaluates macroprudential policy frameworks. The paper uses 
Korea as an example and conducts an empirical evaluation of noncore liabilities of 
Korean banks as a measure of the financial cycle.
1. introduction
Prior to 2007, there was a general consensus in central banks about most ele-
ments of monetary policy strategy and prudential supervision of the financial 
system. Then, starting in August 2007, the world was hit by what Alan Green-
span, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, described as a “once-in-a-cen-
tury credit tsunami.” The credit tsunami not only flattened the world economy, 
resulting in the most severe worldwide economic contraction since the Great 
Depression, but has also called into question the basic policy strategies used to 
manage the economy. This has led to a new focus on macroprudential regula-
tion and supervision, that is, regulation and supervision of the financial system 
that focuses on system-wide risk, rather than just the riskiness of individual 
financial institutions, as an important policy tool to promote a healthy economy.
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This study examines macroprudential policies in open emerging economies, 
with a particular emphasis on South Korea. We start in Section 2 by first exam-
ining why thinking has changed about basic policy strategies to manage the 
economy. Section 3 examines in more detail the rationale for macroprudential 
policies and the need for policymakers to monitor the financial cycle and sys-
temic risks. We then discuss in Section 4 one particularly promising measure of 
the state of the financial cycle, the growth of noncore liabilities of the financial 
sector. This section also applies the analysis to Korea and conducts an empiri-
cal evaluation of noncore liabilities of Korean banks as a measure of the finan-
cial cycle. Section 5 broadens the discussion to evaluate macroprudential policy 
frameworks. Section 6 provides some concluding remarks.
2. How Has Thinking Changed about policies to manage the economy?
To put things into perspective, we will first examine how central bankers and 
academic economists viewed the basic policy strategy before the crisis and then 
go on to discuss how their thinking has changed as a result of the crisis.1
2.1. Basic Policy Strategy before the Crisis
Before the crisis there was broad consensus in central banks and academia for 
a policy framework that pursued a form of flexible inflation targeting, while 
assuming a dichotomy between monetary policy and financial stability pol-
icy. There was somewhat less agreement on what the central bank’s response 
should be to asset price bubbles.2
2.1.1. Flexible inflation targeting
The basic monetary policy framework followed by almost all central banks (who 
had the ability to conduct an independent monetary policy because they did not 
pursue an exchange rate peg) involved a strong, credible commitment by the 
central bank to stabilize inflation in the long run, often at an explicit numerical 
level. However, it also allowed for the central bank to pursue policies to stabi-
lize output around its natural rate in the short run.3 This framework is referred 
to in the academic literature as “flexible inflation targeting” (Svensson 1997), 
although the phrase “inflation targeting” to describe this monetary policy strat-
egy is somewhat unfortunate. This is because central banks have followed dif-
ferent approaches to the communication strategy of flexible inflation targeting, 
with some objecting to characterizing their inflation objective as a target.
Many central banks, such as the Bank of Korea, have announced an explicit 
numerical inflation objective and treat it as a target, and these are classified as 
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full-fledged inflation targeters. Others are reluctant to be so explicit. For exam-
ple, the Federal Reserve has espoused a strong commitment to stabilize infla-
tion, but has not been willing to announce an explicit inflation objective.4 The 
Federal Reserve reports on the individual Federal Open Market Committee 
participants’ projections of inflation in the long run under “appropriate mone-
tary policy.” In effect, the Fed provides the long-run inflation objective for each 
FOMC participant, but has not required that the participants agree on a com-
mon objective for inflation. The Federal Reserve has therefore not yet adopted 
an agreed-upon inflation objective and so it is not classified as being in the infla-
tion-targeting camp. On the other hand, the FOMC participants’ long-run infla-
tion projections all have been in a pretty tight range between 1½ and 2 percent, 
and so they are not far from committing to a specific inflation objective, and not 
very large modifications in their communication strategy would move them to 
the inflation-targeting camp (Mishkin 2008). In other cases, such as the Euro-
pean Central Bank (ECB) or the Swiss National Bank, central banks have been 
willing to announce an explicit numerical inflation objective, but are reluctant to 
treat it as a target because they believe that this would not give them sufficient 
flexibility. They are unwilling to be classified as inflation targeters because they 
believe that the use of the word “target” might lead the public to expect them to 
hit the inflation targets too precisely or over too specific a horizon.
Despite these apparent differences in communication strategy, the basic 
approach of central banks with an independent monetary policy before the 
crisis was very similar. They were willing to conduct monetary policy under 
a strong commitment to stabilize inflation in the long run. Indeed, Svensson 
(2002) argues that any central bank that indicates it will pursue the standard 
objective function which involves minimizing both inflation and the output gap 
in an intertemporal setting is effectively a flexible inflation targeter. Before the 
crisis, almost all central banks with an independent monetary policy fell into 
this classification.
2.1.2. Dichotomy between monetary and financial policy
Although most central bankers were aware that financial disruptions could 
have a serious negative impact on the economy, nonetheless, the general equi-
librium modeling frameworks at most central banks did not incorporate finan-
cial frictions as a major source of business cycle fluctuations. This naturally 
led to a dichotomy between monetary policy and financial stability policy in 
which these two types of policies were conducted separately. Monetary pol-
icy instruments focused on minimizing inflation and output gaps. It would then 
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be up to prudential regulation and supervision to prevent excessive risk-tak-
ing that could promote financial instability. Although most central banks sup-
ported the dichotomy between monetary policy and financial stability policy, 
some expressed the view that monetary policy should address financial stabil-
ity issues, particularly with regard to responding to potential asset price bub-
bles, as discussed below.
2.1.3.  The “lean” versus “clean” debate on the response to possible  
asset price bubbles
An active debate in central banks before the crisis focused on how central banks 
should respond to potential asset price bubbles. Because asset prices are a central 
element in the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy, the theory of optimal 
monetary policy requires that monetary policy respond to asset prices to obtain 
good outcomes in terms of inflation and output. Hence, the issue of how monetary 
policy might respond to asset price movements is not whether it should respond 
at all, but whether it should respond over and above the response called for in 
terms of objectives to stabilize inflation and employment. Another way of stating 
the question is, should monetary policy try to pop or slow the growth of devel-
oping asset price bubbles to minimize damage to the economy when these bub-
bles burst? Alternatively, should the monetary authorities not respond directly 
to possible asset price bubbles, but instead respond to asset price declines only 
after a bubble bursts to stabilize both output and inflation? These two positions 
have been characterized as leaning against asset price bubbles versus cleaning 
up after the bubble bursts. And so, the debate over what to do about asset price 
bubbles has been characterized as the “lean” versus “clean” debate.
Even before the crisis, there was no question that asset price bubbles have 
negative effects on the economy. As Dupor (2005) has emphasized, the depar-
ture of asset prices from fundamentals can lead to inappropriate investments 
that decrease the efficiency of the economy. Furthermore, the bursting of bub-
bles throughout history has been followed by sharp declines in economic activ-
ity, as Kindleberger’s (1978) famous book demonstrated.
The clear-cut dangers of asset price bubbles before the crisis led some econ-
omists both inside and outside central banks—such as Cecchetti et al. (2000), 
Borio and Lowe (2002), Borio, English, and Filardo (2003), and White (2004)—
to argue that central banks should at times “lean against the wind” by raising 
interest rates to stop bubbles from getting out of hand. They argued that raising 
interest rates to slow a bubble’s growth would produce better outcomes because 
it would either prevent the bubble or would result in a less-severe bursting of 
the bubble, with far less damage to the economy.
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The opposing “clean” view states that asset prices should have a special role 
in the conduct of monetary policy over and above that implied by their foresee-
able effect on inflation and employment. This is often referred to as the Greens-
pan doctrine because he strenuously argued that monetary policy should not 
try to lean against asset price bubbles, but rather should just clean up after they 
burst (Greenspan 2002). There are several elements of this argument.
First, bubbles are hard to detect. To justify leaning against a bubble, a cen-
tral bank is assuming that it can identify a bubble in progress. That assumption 
was viewed as highly dubious because it is hard to believe that the central bank 
has such an informational advantage over private markets. If the central bank 
has no informational advantage, and if it knows that a bubble has developed, 
the market will almost surely know this too, and the bubble will burst. Thus, 
any bubble that could be identified with certainty by the central bank would be 
unlikely ever to develop much further.
A second objection against leaning is that raising interest rates may be very 
ineffective in restraining the bubble because market participants expect such 
high rates of return from buying bubble-driven assets. By definition, bubbles 
are departures from the behavior that is normally incorporated within models, 
and so the tools of monetary policy are unlikely to work normally in abnormal 
conditions.
A third objection is that there are many asset prices, and at any one time a 
bubble may be present in only a fraction of assets. Monetary policy actions are 
a very blunt instrument in such a case, as such actions would likely affect asset 
prices in general, rather than solely those in a bubble.
Fourth, although some theoretical models suggest that raising interest 
rates could diminish the acceleration of asset prices, others suggest that rais-
ing interest rates would cause a bubble to burst more severely, thus doing even 
more damage to the economy (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999; Greens-
pan 2002; Gruen, Plumb, and Stone 2005; and Kohn 2006). This view was sup-
ported by historical examples, such as the monetary tightening that occurred 
in 1928 and 1929 in the United States and 1989 in Japan, suggesting that rais-
ing interest rates may cause a bubble to burst more severely, thereby increas-
ing the damage to the economy. Another way of saying this is that bubbles are 
departures from normal behavior, and it is unrealistic to expect that the usual 
tools of monetary policy will be effective in abnormal conditions. Attempts to 
prick bubbles were thus viewed as possibly violating the Hippocratic oath of “do 
no harm.”
Finally, there was a view that the monetary authorities had the tools to 
keep the harmful effects of a bursting bubble at a manageable level, as long as 
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they respond in a timely fashion. This was true even if interest rates fell and 
approached the zero lower bound, and so the conventional tool of lowering the 
policy interest rate was no longer an option. The economy could be stimulated 
by (1) managing expectations so that the policy rate would be viewed as stay-
ing low for an extended period, thereby lowering long-term interest rates, (2) 
lowering risk and term premiums by purchasing securities, thereby changing 
their relative supply, and (3) intervening in foreign exchange rate markets to 
lower the value of the domestic currency, thereby increasing foreign demand 
for domestic production.
One counter argument to this view was the experience of Japan after the 
bursting of its stock market and real estate bubble. However, as Posen (2003) 
pointed out, the problem in Japan was not so much the bursting of the bubble as 
it was the subsequent policies. The imbalances in Japan’s banking sector were 
not resolved, so they continued to get worse well after the bubble had burst. In 
addition, as pointed out in Ahearne et al. (2002), the Bank of Japan did not ease 
monetary policy sufficiently or rapidly enough in the aftermath of the crisis.
The bottom line from this reasoning was that the cost of leaning against 
asset price bubbles was likely to be high, while the costs of bursting bubbles 
could be kept low. Instead of trying to lean against bubbles, central banks 
should just clean up after the bubble burst. This approach was fully consistent 
with monetary policy focusing on stabilizing inflation and employment without 
a special focus on asset price bubbles.
Another argument against focusing on asset prices is that it could lead to 
public confusion about policy objectives. As reported in Giavazzi and Mishkin 
(2006), interviews with participants from different sectors of Swedish society 
suggested that statements on house prices by the Riksbank confused the pub-
lic and led to a general weakening of confidence in the Swedish central bank.
The Greenspan doctrine, which was strongly supported by Federal Reserve 
officials, generally held sway in the central banking community before the cri-
sis. However, even among central bankers there were dissenting voices. The 
Reserve Bank of Australia during the period from 2002 to 2004 argued that 
rising housing prices in Australia posed a risk to the economy, and there is 
evidence that developments in the housing market encouraged the Bank to 
tighten monetary policy earlier rather than later (see Bloxham, Kent, and Rob-
son 2010). In several meetings in 2004, a minority of members of the Monetary 
Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England argued for raising interest 
rates to reduce the risks that high house price appreciation and the rapid accu-
mulation of household debt would lead to an abrupt adjustment process. State-
ments from officials at the ECB and other central banks also suggested that 
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the possibility of an asset boom or bust might require a longer period than the 
usual one to two years to assess whether the price stability goal was being met 
(Issing 2003a, b; King 2004a, b; Stevens 2004; Selody and Wilkins 2004; Bank of 
Canada 2006; and Rosenberg 2006).
2.2. Lessons from the Financial Crisis
There are three lessons from what occurred during the financial crisis that 
have a bearing on basic policy strategy.5
2.2.1.  Developments in the financial sector have a far greater impact  
on economic activity than was recognized earlier
Although central bankers generally recognized that financial frictions could 
play an important role in business cycle fluctuations, the 2007–09 financial cri-
sis made it clear that the adverse effects of financial disruptions on economic 
activity could be far worse than was anticipated for advanced economies. When 
the financial crisis started in August 2007, central bank actions to contain it 
seemed to work. Many officials at the central banks, although still concerned 
about the disruption to the financial markets, hoped that the worst was over and 
that the financial system would begin to recover (see Mishkin 2011b). The sub-
prime mortgage sector was after all only a small part of the overall capital mar-
ket, and the losses in the subprime mortgage market, although substantial, still 
seemed manageable. By the summer of 2008, central banks were even turning 
their attention to the very high inflation rates at the time; for example, there 
were discussions inside the Federal Reserve whether the easing phase of mone-
tary policy might have to be reversed to contain inflation (e.g., see Wessel 2009).
But then came a set of shocks that sent the financial system and the econ-
omy over the cliff: the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, 
the AIG collapse on September 16, the run on the Reserve Primary Fund 
on the same day, and the U.S. Treasury’s struggle to get the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program approved by the U.S. Congress over the next couple of weeks 
(Mishkin 2011b). The financial crisis morphed into a global crisis that caused a 
sharp drop in economic activity in the United States—real GDP declined at an 
annual rate of –1.3 percent in 2008:Q4, –5.4 percent in 2009:Q1, and –6.4 per-
cent in 2009:Q2—but in the rest of the world as well—with real GDP falling 
at a –6.4 percent rate in the fourth quarter of 2008 and a –7.3 percent rate in 
the first quarter of 2009. The unemployment rate shot up to over 10 percent in 
the United States and in many other advanced economies, with the unemploy-
ment rate remaining stubbornly high even after the world economy started to 
recover. The worldwide recession that resulted from the financial crisis turned 
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out to be the most severe economic contraction since the worldwide depression 
of the 1930s.
The global financial crisis of 2007–09 therefore demonstrated that financial 
frictions have become front and center in macroeconomic analysis. They no lon-
ger could be ignored in the macroeconometric models that central banks use 
for forecasting and policy analysis, as was generally the case before the crisis.
2.2.2. The cost of cleaning up after financial crises is very high
Besides the obvious cost of a huge loss of aggregate output as a result of the 
worldwide recession, the global financial crisis suggests that there are likely to 
be three additional costs that will raise the costs far higher: (1) financial crises 
are typically followed by very slow growth, (2) the budgetary position of gov-
ernments sharply deteriorates, and (3) the exit strategy for central banks from 
nonconventional monetary policy may be complicated and may hinder the abil-
ity of the central bank to successfully manage the economy in the future.
When economies experience deep recessions, the typical experience is that 
they subsequently have very strong recoveries, often referred to as V-shaped 
recoveries. However, as Reinhart and Reinhart (2010) document, this V-shaped 
pattern is not characteristic of recessions that follow financial crises because 
the deleveraging process takes a long time, resulting in strong headwinds for 
the economy. When analyzing 15 severe post-World War II financial crises, the 
Great Depression, the 1973 oil shock period, and the recent crisis, they find that 
real GDP growth rates are significantly lower during the decade following this 
episode, with the median decline in GDP growth being about 1 percent. Fur-
thermore, unemployment rates stay persistently higher for the decade after cri-
sis episodes, with the median unemployment rate five percentage points higher 
in advanced economies. Although we have many years to go before a decade 
goes by after the most recent crisis, it actually looks like it might have worse 
outcomes than the average crisis episode studied by Reinhart and Reinhart. 
They find that 82 percent of the observations of per capita GDP from 2008 to 
2010 remained below or equal to the 2007 level, while the comparable number 
for the 15 earlier crisis episodes was 60 percent. We now recognize that the 
cumulative output losses from financial crises are massive, and this current cri-
sis looks like it will be no exception.
As pointed out by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), the aftermath of financial 
crises is almost always a sharp increase in government indebtedness. We have 
seen exactly this situation in the aftermath of the current crisis. The massive 
bailouts of financial institutions, fiscal stimulus packages, and sharp economic 
contractions that reduced tax revenue that occurred throughout the world have 
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adversely affected the fiscal situation for many countries. Budget deficits over 
10 percent of GDP in advanced countries like the United States have become 
common. Furthermore, this rise in indebtedness has the potential to lead to 
sovereign debt defaults, which have come to the fore with the Greek sovereign 
debt crisis and concerns about the long-term fiscal health of other European 
countries, including Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy. The fiscal retrench-
ments required to put fiscal balances on a sustainable path are likely to not only 
be contractionary but also to increase societal stress. Indeed, there is even a 
possibility that the fiscal problems brought on by the crisis could lead countries 
to exit the euro area.
Actions by central banks to contain the global financial crisis resulted in 
huge expansions of their balance sheets. The expansion of balance sheets aris-
ing from liquidity provision is typically easy to reverse because most of the 
liquidity facilities have provided loans at interest rates that are higher than 
market rates during normal times. Hence these liquidity facilities are self-liqui-
dating because, as financial markets return to normal, market participants are 
no longer willing to borrow at above-market rates, so the use of these facilities 
shrinks. Hence this source of balance sheet expansion naturally reverses itself 
as the financial system recovers, and this is exactly what has happened.
A far more serious concern is the expansion of the balance sheet that stems 
from asset market purchases. This expansion of the balance sheet is not self-
liqui dating, and there are concerns that the resulting expansion of the mone-
tary base will lead to high inflation in the future. This concern would be more 
worrisome if an expansion in the monetary base were closely linked to an 
expansion in the money supply, but this is not the case in the current environ-
ment. Because banks are perfectly happy to hold onto huge amounts of excess 
reserves as long as they are paid interest on them, as is the case currently, high 
growth rates in the monetary base do not translate into high growth rates of 
the money supply. Hence, quantitative easing and the resulting increase in the 
monetary base are unlikely to be inflationary.
More problematic is that asset market purchases were often for long-term 
securities, which expose the central bank to interest risk (and credit risk if it buys 
private securities like mortgage-backed securities) because these securities can 
have substantial price fluctuations. Possible losses on these securities thus mean 
that there could be an erosion of capital in the central bank’s balance sheet, and 
this could subject it to congressional or parliamentary criticism and actions that 
could weaken its ability to conduct an independent monetary policy. In addition, 
if the central bank has bought private securities, their presence on the balance 
sheet means that the central bank has encroached on the politicians’ turf be-
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cause the central bank has engaged in a form of fiscal policy, which makes its poli- 
tical position more precarious, again possibly leading to a loss of independence.
Even the purchase of long-term government securities poses a danger for 
central banks because it may create the perception that the central bank is will-
ing to accommodate irresponsible fiscal policy by monetizing the debt. This is 
a particular concern right now in the euro area, where the ECB has purchased 
securities issued by governments that not only have large fiscal imbalances but, 
in the case of Greece, have even lied about their fiscal position. This problem is 
also a serious concern in the United States, where both political parties have 
been unwilling to address long-run trends in entitlements that could cause U.S. 
government debt to explode. Not only can the purchase of long-term govern-
ment assets encourage fiscal profligacy, but it can also lead to an unhinging of 
inflation expectations, which could make it difficult for the central bank to con-
trol inflation in the future.
2.2.3. Price and output stability do not ensure financial stability
The inability of price and output stability to ensure financial stability is per-
haps the most important lesson for central banks from the recent financial cri-
sis. Before the crisis, the common view, both in academia and in central banks, 
was that achieving price and output stability would promote financial stability. 
This was supported by research (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999, and 
Bernanke and Gertler 2001), which indicated that monetary policy that opti-
mally stabilizes inflation and output is likely to stabilize asset prices, making 
asset price bubbles less likely. Indeed, the success of central banks in stabi-
lizing inflation and decreasing volatility of business cycle fluctuations, which 
became known as the Great Moderation, made policymakers complacent about 
the risks from financial disruptions.
The benign economic environment leading up to 2007, however, surely did 
not protect the economy from financial instability. Indeed, it may have pro-
moted it. The low volatility of both inflation and output fluctuations may have 
lulled market participants into thinking there was less risk in the economic sys-
tem than was really the case. Credit risk premiums fell to very low levels, and 
underwriting standards for loans dropped considerably. Some recent theoret-
ical research even suggests that benign economic environments may promote 
excessive risk-taking and may actually make the financial system more fragile 
(Gambacorta 2009). Although price and output stability are surely beneficial, 
the recent crisis indicates that a policy focused solely on these objectives may 
not be enough to produce good economic outcomes.
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2.3. Implications for Monetary and Macroprudential Policy Strategy
Now we can see what the implications of these lessons are for basic policy strat-
egy and in particular for macroprudential policies.
2.3.1. Flexible inflation targeting
The first key point is that the lessons from the crisis do not invalidate the ben-
efits of having a strong, credible commitment to stabilize inflation in the long 
run, which is the key rationale for adopting a flexible inflation targeting frame-
work. (For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Mishkin 2011a.) Indeed, 
as argued elsewhere (Mishkin 2008), a strong, credible commitment to stabilize 
inflation can be even more valuable in periods of financial market stress, when 
prompt and decisive expansionary monetary policy may be required to prevent 
a market meltdown, but which will only be effective if inflation expectations 
remain grounded.
However, although the case for a flexible inflation targeting framework 
is not weakened by the lessons from the financial crisis, they do suggest that 
details of how such a framework is executed would benefit from some rethink-
ing. Particularly important in this regard is thinking about the lean versus 
clean debate regarding whether monetary policy should react to potential asset 
price bubbles.
2.3.2. The lean versus clean debate
In thinking about this debate, it is worth distinguishing between two differ-
ent types of asset price bubbles. As pointed out in Mishkin (2010a), not all asset 
price bubbles are alike. Financial history and the financial crisis of 2007–09 indi-
cate that one type of bubble, which is best referred to as a credit-driven bubble, 
can be highly dangerous. With this type of bubble, there is the following typical 
chain of events: Because of either exuberant expectations about economic pros-
pects or structural changes in financial markets, a credit boom begins, increas-
ing the demand for some assets and thereby raising their prices. The rise in 
asset values, in turn, encourages further lending against these assets, increas-
ing demand, and hence their prices, even more. This feedback loop can generate 
a bubble, and the bubble can cause credit standards to ease as lenders become 
less concerned about the ability of the borrowers to repay loans and instead rely 
on further appreciation of the asset to shield themselves from losses.
At some point, however, the bubble bursts. The collapse in asset prices then 
leads to a reversal of the feedback loop in which loans go sour, lenders cut back 
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on credit supply, the demand for the assets declines further, and prices drop 
even more. The resulting loan losses and declines in asset prices erode the bal-
ance sheets at financial institutions, further diminishing credit and investment 
across a broad range of assets. The decline in lending depresses business and 
household spending, which weakens economic activity and increases macroeco-
nomic risk in credit markets. In the extreme, the interaction between asset 
prices and the health of financial institutions following the collapse of an asset 
price bubble can endanger the operation of the financial system as a whole.
However, there is a second type of bubble that is far less dangerous, which 
can be referred to as an irrational exuberance bubble. This type of bubble is 
driven solely by overly optimistic expectations and poses much less risk to the 
financial system than credit-driven bubbles. For example, the bubble in tech-
nology stocks in the late 1990s was not fueled by a feedback loop between bank 
lending and rising equity values, and so the bursting of the tech-stock bubble 
was not accompanied by a marked deterioration in bank balance sheets. The 
bursting of the tech-stock bubble thus did not have a very severe impact on the 
economy and the recession that followed was quite mild.
However, we have learned from the recent crisis that the bursting of credit-
driven bubbles not only can be extremely costly, but are very hard to clean up 
afterward. Furthermore, bubbles of this type can occur even if there is price 
and output stability in the period leading up to them. Indeed, price and output 
stability might actually encourage credit-driven bubbles because it leads mar-
ket participants to underestimate the amount of risk in the economy. The case 
for leaning against potential bubbles rather than cleaning up afterwards has 
therefore become much stronger.
However, the distinction between the two types of bubbles, one of which 
(credit-driven bubbles) is much more costly than the other, suggests that the 
lean versus clean debate may have been miscast, as White (2009) indicates. 
Rather than leaning against potential asset price bubbles, which would include 
both credit-driven and irrational exuberance type bubbles, there is a much 
stronger case for leaning against credit bubbles which would involve leaning 
against credit-driven bubbles, but not irrational exuberance bubbles. As White 
(2009) and Mishkin (2010a) have pointed out, it is much easier to identify credit 
bubbles than it is to identify asset price bubbles. Financial regulators and cen-
tral banks often have information that lenders have weakened their underwrit-
ing standards, that risk premiums appear to be inordinately low, or that credit 
extension is rising at abnormally high rates. The argument that it is hard to 
identify asset price bubbles is therefore not a valid argument opposing leaning 
against credit bubbles.
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2.3.3. Macroprudential policies
This realization leads directly to the main theme of this report, which is the 
use of macroprudential policies to address the potential buildup of financial 
vulnerability. Although there is a strong case to lean against credit bubbles, 
what policies will be most effective? First, it is important to recognize that the 
key principle for designing effective policies to lean against credit bubbles is 
whether they fix market failures. Credit extension necessarily involves risk-
taking. It is only when this risk-taking is excessive because of market failures 
that credit bubbles are likely to develop. Recognizing that market failures are 
the problem, it is natural to look to prudential regulatory measures to constrain 
credit bubbles.
Some regulatory measures to fix market failures are simply the usual ele-
ments of a well-functioning prudential regulatory and supervisory system. 
These elements include adequate disclosure and capital requirements, liquid-
ity requirements, prompt corrective action, careful monitoring of an institu-
tion’s risk-management procedures, close supervision of financial institutions 
to enforce compliance with regulations, and sufficient resources and account-
ability for supervisors. However, the standard measures mentioned focus on 
promoting the safety and soundness of individual firms and fall into the cat-
egory of what is referred to as microprudential supervision. However, even if 
individual firms are operating prudently, there still is a danger of excessive 
risk-taking because of the interactions between financial firms that promote 
externalities. An alternative regulatory approach, which deals with these inter-
actions, focuses on what is happening in credit markets in the aggregate and 
involves macroprudential policies.
This recognition provides a strong rationale for macroprudential policies, 
which we discuss in Section 3 of this study. However, in designing macropru-
dential policies, we require measures of when excessive risk-taking is taking 
place systemically. We discuss such potential measures in Section 4. Macropru-
dential tools can be used to dampen the interaction between asset price bub-
bles and credit provision, and these are discussed in more detail in Section 5 of 
this study.
2.3.4. Monetary policy
The fact that the low interest rate policies of the Federal Reserve from 2002 to 
2005 were followed by excessive risk-taking suggests to many that overly easy 
monetary policy might promote financial instability. Using aggregate data, Tay-
lor (2007) has argued that excessively low policy rates led to the housing bubble, 
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while Bernanke (2010), Bean et al. (2010), Turner (2010) and Posen (2009) have 
argued otherwise. Although it is far from clear that the Federal Reserve is to 
blame for the housing bubble, the explosion of microeconomic research, both 
theoretical and empirical, suggests that there is a case for monetary policy to 
play a role in creating credit bubbles. Borio and Zhu (2008) have called this 
mechanism the “risk-taking channel of monetary policy.”
The literature provides two basic reasons why low interest rates might pro-
mote excessive risk-taking. First, as Rajan (2005, 2006) points out, low inter-
est rates can increase the incentives for asset managers in financial institutions 
to search for yield and hence increase risk-taking. These incentives could come 
from contractual arrangements that compensate asset managers for returns 
above a minimum level, often zero, and with low nominal interest rates only 
high-risk investments will lead to high compensation. They also could come 
from fixed-rate commitments, such as those provided by insurance companies, 
forcing the firm to seek out higher yielding, riskier investments. Or they could 
arise from behavioral considerations such as money illusion in which asset man-
agers believe that low nominal rates indicate that real returns are low, encour-
aging them to purchase riskier assets to obtain a higher target return.
A second mechanism for how low interest rates could promote risk-taking 
operates through income and valuation effects. Low interest rates increase net 
interest margins and increase the value of financial firms, boosting their capac-
ity to increase their leverage and take on risk (Adrian and Shin 2009, 2010, 
and Adrian, Moench, and Shin 2010). In addition, low interest rates can boost 
collateral values, again enabling increased lending. This mechanism is closely 
related to the financial accelerator of Bernanke and Gertler (1999) and Ber-
nanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), except that it derives from financial fric-
tions for lenders rather than borrowers.
Monetary policy can also encourage risk-taking in two other ways. Although 
desirable from a viewpoint of establishing credibility and a strong nominal 
anchor, more predictable monetary policy can reduce uncertainty and encour-
age asset managers to underestimate risk (Gambacorta 2009). Monetary policy 
that cleans up after financial disruptions by lowering interest rates, which has 
been named the “Greenspan put” because this was the actual and stated pol-
icy of the Federal Reserve when Alan Greenspan headed the Fed, can lead to a 
form of moral hazard in which financial institutions expect monetary policy to 
help them recover from bad investments (e.g., see Tirole and Farhi 2009, Keis-
ter 2010, and Wilson and Wu 2010). The Greenspan put can also increase sys-
temic risk because it is only exercised when many financial firms are in trouble 
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simultaneously, and so they may be encouraged to pursue similar investment 
strategies, thereby increasing the correlation of returns.
Micro empirical analysis provides a fair amount of support for the risk-
taking channel of monetary policy. Jimenez et al. (2008), using Spanish credit 
registry data, find that low nominal interest rates, although they decrease 
the probability of defaults in the short term, lead to riskier lending and more 
defaults in the medium term. Ioannidou, Ongena, and Peydro (2009) examine 
a quasi-controlled experiment in Bolivia and find that lower U.S. federal funds 
rates increase lending to low-quality borrowers that end up with higher rates of 
default and yet at lower interest rate spreads. Delis and Kouretas (2010), using 
data from euro-area banks, find a negative relationship between the level of 
interest rates and the riskiness of bank lending.
Adrian and Shin (2010) discuss and provide evidence for the risk-taking 
channel of monetary policy using more aggregate data. They find that reduc-
tions in the federal funds rate increase term spreads and, hence, the net inter-
est margin for financial intermediaries. The higher net interest margin, which 
makes financial intermediaries more profitable, is then associated with higher 
asset growth, which they interpret as a shift in credit supply, and which in turn 
predicts higher real GDP growth.
Given the support for the risk-taking channel, does this mean that mon-
etary policy should be used to lean against credit bubbles? There are several 
objections to doing so. First, if monetary policy is used to lean against credit 
bubbles, it violates the Tinbergen (1939) principle because one instrument is 
being asked to do two jobs: stabilize the financial sector and stabilize the econ-
omy. Because there is another instrument to stabilize the financial sector, that 
is macroprudential supervision, would it not be better to use macroprudential 
supervision to deal with financial stability, leaving monetary policy to focus on 
price and output stability?
This argument suggests that macroprudential policies would be the first 
line of defense against credit bubbles. This is why we focus so much attention 
on these policies in this study. However, there are reasons why macroprudential 
policies may not always be sufficiently effective, providing a possible rationale 
for using monetary policy to restrain credit bubbles. Prudential supervision is 
subject to more political pressure than is monetary policy because it affects the 
bottom line of financial institutions more directly. Thus they will have greater 
incentives to lobby politicians to discourage macroprudential policies that would 
rein in credit bubbles. After all, it is during a credit bubble that financial institu-
tions make the most money and so have greater incentives and more resources 
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to lobby politicians to prevent restrictive macroprudential policies. A case in 
point has been the recent Basel III accord. Press reports suggest that the capi-
tal standards in the accord were substantially weakened because of complaints 
by the German Landesbanken. Furthermore, implementation of the accord was 
put off for almost 10 years, and the accord did not contain measures to deal with 
systemic risk considerations, such as adjusting capital requirements over the 
credit cycle. The Basel III episode suggests that political considerations may 
make it extremely difficult to have effective macroprudential supervision.
The possibility that macroprudential policies may not be implemented suf-
ficiently well to constrain credit bubbles, suggests that monetary policy may 
have to be used instead. But this raises another objection to using monetary 
policy to lean against credit bubbles: it may not work. We are sympathetic to 
the view discussed earlier that tightening monetary policy may be ineffective in 
restraining a particular asset bubble because market participants expect such 
high rates of return from purchasing bubble-driven assets. On the other hand, 
the evidence on the risk-taking channel of monetary policy suggests that there 
is a stronger case that raising interest rates would help restrain lending growth 
and excessive risk-taking. Furthermore, the theoretical analysis we discussed 
earlier suggests that if a central bank credibly commits to raise interest rates 
when a credit bubble looks like it is forming, then expectations in credit markets 
will work to make this policy more effective. The expectation that rates will go 
up with increased risk-taking will make this kind of activity less profitable and 
thus make it less likely that it will occur. Furthermore, expectations that rates 
will rise with increased risk-taking means that interest rates will not have to be 
raised as much to have their intended effect.
Nonetheless, using monetary policy to lean against credit bubbles is not 
a monetary policy strategy that can be taken lightly. Doing so could at times 
result in a weaker economy than the monetary authorities would desire or infla-
tion that is too low. This suggests that there is a monetary policy trade-off 
between the pursuit of financial stability and the pursuit of price and output 
stability. Also as mentioned earlier, giving monetary policy another objective 
might lead to confusion about the central bank’s commitment to price stability, 
thereby weakening the nominal anchor, with potentially adverse effects on eco-
nomic outcomes.
Another danger from using monetary policy as a tool to promote financial 
stability is that it might lead to decisions to tighten monetary policy when it is 
not needed to constrain credit bubbles. A situation of low interest rates does 
not necessarily indicate that monetary policy is promoting excessive risk-tak-
ing. One lesson from the discussion here is that policymakers, and especially 
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monetary policymakers, will need tools to assess whether credit bubbles are 
developing. This provides an additional motivation for our analysis of measures 
to assess when excessive systemic risk-taking is occurring that we discuss in 
Section 4 of this study. Such measures can help central banks decide if there 
is imminent danger of credit bubbles, and whether monetary policy may have 
to be adjusted, in addition to using macroprudential policies, to restrain them. 
Monitoring of credit market conditions will become an essential activity of cen-
tral banks in the future.
This danger of thinking of using monetary policy to promote financial sta-
bility is highly relevant today. Some economists, for example Hoenig (2010) and 
Rajan (2010), have called for the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates because 
they argue that the current low rates encourage excessive risk-taking. The 
$600 billion large-scale asset purchase (LSAP) program the Federal Reserve 
adopted in November 2010 has led to further criticism of Federal Reserve mon-
etary policy, with many commentators in the media suggesting that this would 
also encourage excessive risk-taking. However, the U.S. economy is currently 
not in a situation of rapid credit growth, low-risk premiums, and increasing 
leverage. Indeed, it still seems to be mired in a deleveraging cycle that is pro-
ducing serious headwinds for the economy. This does not mean that the situa-
tion could not change. However, the Federal Reserve’s expansionary monetary 
policy does not appear to be creating the next credit bubble in the United States 
and justification for raising interest rates and abandoning LSAPs on these 
grounds is very weak.6
But are there dangers from the current expansionary U.S. monetary policy 
for other countries, especially open emerging economies? The answer could be 
yes, because many emerging market economies are currently in a very differ-
ent environment, with rapid credit growth and rapidly rising real estate prices. 
The empirical research by Ioannidou, Ongena, and Peydro (2009) is particularly 
relevant on this point, because it shows that low U.S. interest rates helped pro-
mote a lending boom in an open emerging economy, in this case Bolivia. As we 
discuss in Section 4, we find corroborating evidence for such an effect in Korea 
because U.S. interest rates are found to be an important driver of the Korean 
credit cycle.
The current expansionary monetary policy suggests that policies in open 
emerging market countries could be directed at prevention of a credit bubble. 
But does this mean that monetary policy tools should be used to do so? In some 
cases, monetary policy is not an option because the exchange rate is in effect 
pegged to an anchor currency like the U.S. dollar. However, even in other cases 
where there is no exchange rate peg, monetary policy may not be effective at 
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constraining credit booms. Again, our empirical results for Korea in Section 5 
shed light on this issue. There we find that Korean interest rates do not appear 
to be an important driver of the Korean credit cycle, although U.S. interest 
rates are. In addition, as discussed in Section 3, open emerging market econ-
omies face the dilemma that when foreign interest rates are very low, raising 
domestic interest rates may just encourage capital inflows that may exacerbate 
the credit boom, rather than restraining it.
The situation thus argues for an even greater focus on macroprudential pol-
icies in open emerging market economies. However, not all open emerging mar-
ket economies are in the same boat right now. For instance, liability measures 
in Korea do not suggest that Korea has yet exited from a deleveraging cycle. 
Other emerging market economies look quite different, suggesting that they 
may have to tighten macroprudential standards to slow credit growth.
2.3.5. Interaction between monetary and macroprudential policies
Another lesson from the financial crisis and this discussion is that monetary 
policy and financial stability policy are intrinsically linked to each other, and 
so the dichotomy between monetary and financial stability policy is a false one. 
As we have seen, monetary policy can affect financial stability, while macro-
prudential policies to promote financial stability will have an impact on mon-
etary policy. If macroprudential policies are implemented to restrain a credit 
bubble, they will slow credit growth and the growth of aggregate demand. To 
counter this slow growth in aggregate demand, monetary policy would be more 
stimulatory to stabilize inflation and output. Alternatively, if policy rates are 
kept low to stimulate the economy, there is a greater risk that a credit bubble 
might occur. This may result in tighter macroprudential policies to ensure that 
a credit bubble does not get started. Coordination of monetary and macropru-
dential policies would make it easier to pursue all three objectives of price sta-
bility, output stability, and financial stability.
3. Balance sheet aggregates and Financial stability
The traditional approach to financial regulation is focused on the task of ensur-
ing the soundness of individual financial institutions. In the case of banking reg-
ulation, this focus has been given specific form with requirements on minimum 
capital for banks as a proportion of the risk-weighted assets of the bank. How-
ever, the traditional approach based on the “loss absorbency” of capital suffers 
from two shortcomings.
•   Loss absorbency does not address directly excessive asset growth dur-
ing booms.
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•   Preoccupation with  loss absorbency diverts attention  from the  liabili-
ties side of banks’ balance sheets and vulnerabilities from the reliance 
on unstable short-term funding and short-term foreign currency debt.
To be effective, a macroprudential policy framework should address exces-
sive asset growth and fragility of bank liabilities. Start first with the problem 
of excessive asset growth in a lending boom. During a lending boom, high bank 
profitability and low measured risk tend to bolster bank capital ratios. However, 
experience has shown repeatedly that rapid loan growth is achieved only at 
the cost of lowering lending standards. Take the example of Allied Irish Banks 
(AIB), which is currently very topical given the difficulties in Europe, but there 
is no shortage of examples from the recent global financial crisis.
Figure 1 plots AIB’s loan growth and loan loss provisions from 2004 to 
2009. AIB’s loan book increased 43 percent in 2005 and 30 percent in 2006, but 
loan growth came to a sudden halt with the global financial crisis. Provisions 
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were low and falling throughout the lending boom. However, the underlying vul-
nerability of the loan book was exposed by the recession, and provisions have 
jumped above 4 percent.
AIB’s capital ratios were highest at the peak of the boom in 2006 and did not 
issue timely warnings, as seen in Table 1. The severity of the subsequent bust 
calls into question the philosophy of relying on capital ratios while neglecting 
asset growth itself.
Would additional measures, such as forward-looking provisioning, have pre-
vented the collapse? Larger capital cushions would undoubtedly have mitigated 
the shock to the real economy, but the experience of Spain (which had such for-
ward-looking provisioning) suggests that forward-looking provisioning may not 
be sufficient.
Both Ireland and Spain as members of the euro area were prevented from 
using autonomous monetary policy to rein in domestic liquidity. However, as 
discussed in the previous section, the loss of autonomy over monetary policy is 
a more general theme that affects many more countries than just the euro area. 
Emerging economies with open capital markets face constraints on monetary 
policy from carry trade inflows. Faced with low interest rates in advanced econ-
omies, raising domestic interest rates may backfire by inducing greater carry 
trade inflows and looser domestic financial conditions.
The constraints on monetary policy of an economy with open capital mar-
kets can be seen from the findings of a recent empirical study by Kim and Shin 
(2010). This study illustrates the way in which Korea’s monetary policy was 
affected by the U.S. monetary policy stance even after Korea officially adopted 
a floating exchange rate policy.
In Figure 2, the U.S. policy rate, scaled by the left axis, is measured by the 
federal funds target rate, and the Korean policy rate, scaled by the right axis, 
is measured by the target rate set by the Bank of Korea. The figure clearly 
shows that the Korean policy rate follows the U.S. policy rate very closely with 
a few months’ lag. The chart is consistent with the following narrative, often 
encountered in market financial commentary. When U.S. interest rates fall, 
carry trade capital flows into Korea, loosening domestic liquidity conditions and 
boosting the economy. This capital inflow puts the Korean monetary authority 
TaBLE   1 
Capital Ratios for allied irish Banks
	 2004	 2005	 2006	 2007	 2008	 2009
Tier 1 capital ratio (%) 7.9 7.2 8.2 7.5 7.4 7.2
Total capital ratio (%) 10.7 10.7 11.1 10.1 10.5 10.2
 HAHM, MISHKIN, SHIN, & SHIN | MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICIES IN OPEN EMERGING ECONOMIES	 83
in a dilemma, since raising the policy interest rate may further attract capital 
inflows. According to Figure 2, the Korean monetary authorities resolved the 
dilemma by following the stance of U.S. monetary policy and lowering Korean 
rates.
When faced with excessive asset growth fueled by loose domestic financial 
conditions other tools may be necessary to lean against the buildup of vulnera-
bilities. Administrative measures on bank lending such as caps on loan-to-value 
(LTV) ratios and debt service-to-income (DTI) ratios may be important addi-
tional ingredients in the macroprudential policy framework. DTI rules serve as 
an anchor that ties loan growth to the wage level. The experience of Korea and 
other Asian economies suggests that DTI rules may be a useful complement to 
more traditional tools of banking supervision.
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4. noncore liabilities
Excessive asset growth is mirrored on the liabilities side of the balance sheet 
by shifts in the composition of bank funding. The core funding available to the 
banking sector is retail deposits of household savers, which grow in line with 
the aggregate wealth of the household sector. In a lending boom when credit 
is growing very rapidly, the pool of retail deposits is not sufficient to fund the 
increase in bank credit. Other sources of funding are tapped to fund rapidly 
increasing bank lending. The state of the financial cycle is thus reflected in the 
composition of bank liabilities.
In an open emerging economy, rapid increases in the noncore liabili-
ties of the banking system show up as capital inflows through increased for-
eign exchange-denominated liabilities of the banking system. Figure 3 charts 
the noncore liabilities of the Korean banking sector, taken from Shin and Shin 
(2011) with the foreign exchange liabilities shown as the light gray band at the 
top of the chart. Note that the first peak in noncore liabilities coincides with the 
1997 crisis. After a lull in the early 2000s, noncore liabilities increase rapidly in 
the run-up to the 2008 crisis prompted by the fall of Lehman Brothers.
Figure 4 (also from Shin and Shin 2011) plots the noncore liabilities as a 
fraction of M2. We see that there has been substantial variation in noncore lia-
bilities, ranging from around 15 percent of M2 to a peak of 50 percent in the 
Lehman crisis.
Shin and Shin (2011) have argued that the stage of the financial cycle can 
be gauged by using the information on the liabilities side of the banking sector 
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balance sheet. Although monetary aggregates are also liabilities-side aggre-
gates of the banking sector, they argue that traditional monetary aggregates 
can be refined and improved upon to serve as an effective set of indicators that 
underpin effective macroprudential policy. In this regard, they propose an 
approach to bank liability aggregates based on the distinction between core 
and noncore liabilities.
As banks, particularly in emerging market economies, are the most impor-
tant financial intermediary and often play active roles in propagating the finan-
cial cycle, central banks have given special attention to the growth and changing 
composition of bank liabilities. For instance, traditional monetary aggregates 
give a window on the size and composition of bank liabilities, and hence can give 
an insight into the stage of the financial cycle. Key monetary aggregates such 
as M2 track the size of the short-term deposit base of the domestic banking sys-
tem, and hence can serve as a proxy for the claims of the household sector on the 
banking sector, or on the intermediary sector more generally, encompassing 
money market funds and other short-term claims held by the household sector. 
In this way, monetary aggregates open a window on the possibility of macro-
prudential policy that takes cues from the money stock.7
As emphasized by Shin and Shin (2011), traditional classifications of mon-
etary aggregates focus on the transactions role of money as a medium of 
exchange. As such, the criterion is based on how close to cash—how money-
like—a particular financial claim is. Demand deposits are the archetypal money 
measure, since such liabilities of the banking sector can be quickly transferred 
from one person to another. Saving deposits are less money-like, and hence fig-
ure in broader notions of money, such as M2, but even here they fall outside the 
M2 measure if the depositor faces restrictions on easy access to the funds. In 
this way, the traditional hierarchy of monetary aggregates goes from cash to 
very liquid claims, such as demand deposits, going out to more illiquid claims 
on the banking sector such as term saving deposits, with the criterion being 
how easily such claims can be used to settle transactions. In the context of the 
quantity theory equation of money, this traditional monetary aggregate is more 
appropriate in identifying the extent to which inflation is likely.
For financial stability purposes, however, we need an alternative classifica-
tion system for liability aggregates which is more directly related to the propa-
gation of financial risks. The movement of this alternative aggregate must have 
implications for the procyclicality of financial cycles and systemic risk, and this 
property is not always captured by the ease of settlement of transactions. For 
instance, overnight repurchase agreements (repos) between financial institu-
tions are claims that are short-term and highly liquid. However, the financial 
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crisis of 2008 demonstrated through the near-failure of Bear Stearns and the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers that repos can be highly destabilizing when 
the collateral requirements on the repos rise through imposition of higher mar-
gins charged by creditors, setting off a spiral of distress in the financial sys-
tem as a whole (Adrian and Shin 2010, Morris and Shin 2009, and Gorton 2008).
Shin and Shin (2011) emphasize that an important dimension that is not 
addressed in the traditional hierarchy of monetary aggregates is who holds the 
claims. The same claim can have very different financial stability implications 
if they are held by different entities. For instance, the cash deposits of a lever-
aged hedge fund at its prime broker are similar to demand deposits of house-
hold savers in the banking system in terms of how liquid the claim is. However, 
they have very different systemic implications. At the other end of the spectrum 
in terms of liquidity, a covered bond issued by a bank is an extremely illiquid 
long-term claim that is not money-like. However, a covered bond held by long-
term investors such as a pension fund is similar to retail deposits in that the 
funding provided to the banking sector is more sticky—that is, stable—than a 
mortgage-backed security or a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) held by a 
securities firm.
Hence, from the perspective of financial stability, traditional monetary 
aggregates such as M2 fail to capture the stage of financial cycles. The relevant 
distinction is not how cash-like a claim is as embedded in traditional monetary 
aggregates, but rather the core versus noncore distinction that has to do with 
whether the claim is held by the ultimate domestic creditors such as the domes-
tic household sector as it is more stable. For instance, repos and other claims 
held by banks on other banks can be regarded as noncore liabilities, which are 
more volatile.
If the financial system is organized around the capital market, conventional 
measures of money represent only a small proportion of the aggregate size of 
the leveraged sector. Nor is the quantity of deposits the most volatile component 
of the total aggregate liabilities of the financial system. In such a world, moni-
toring money aggregates is less useful for macroprudential policy.
The rapid move toward a market-based financial system in recent years 
has accelerated the trend toward greater reliance on nontraditional, non-
deposit-based funding and toward greater use of the interbank loan market, 
the market for commercial paper, and asset-backed securities. As an illustra-
tion, Figure 5 compares the composition of liabilities of financial institutions in 
major countries. As we can see, the composition of liabilities varies substan-
tially across countries and across time. Note also that the share of deposits 
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differs dramatically across countries, which shows that the usefulness of mone-
tary aggregates is likely to be limited.
For countries with open capital markets, international capital flows play a 
particularly important role in financial stability, and hence have implications for 
the design and implementation of macroprudential policies. As argued by Shin 
and Shin (2011), during a boom when bank assets are growing rapidly, the fund-
ing required outstrips the growth of the domestic deposit base. It is often met 
by capital flows from international banks and is reflected in the growth of short-
term foreign currency-denominated liabilities of the domestic banking system. 
As such, short-term foreign currency-denominated bank liabilities can also be 
seen as volatile noncore liabilities of the banking sector.
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Overall, the core versus noncore properties of bank liabilities provide a bet-
ter window on the actual exposure of the banking sector to financial risk and its 
willingness to increase exposure. As such, the relative size of noncore liabilities 
can be used as a monitoring tool to reflect the stage of the financial cycle and the 
degree of vulnerability to potential setbacks.
4.1. an accounting Framework for Core versus Noncore Bank Liability aggregates
Shin and Shin (2011) considered a basic accounting framework to clarify the 
discussion of core and noncore liabilities. Suppose that the domestic financial 
system consists of ultimate borrowers (domestic firms and households) and ulti-
mate creditors (domestic households). The domestic banking sector channels 
funds from ultimate creditors to ultimate borrowers. There is also a foreign 
creditor sector that stands ready to supply funds to the domestic banking sec-
tor. Shin and Shin (2011) show that the aggregate balance sheet identity can be 
rewritten in the following way.
 Total Credit = Total Equity of Banking Sector
  + Liabilities to Nonbank Domestic Creditors
  + Liabilities to Foreign Creditors
The accounting identity above helps us understand the connections between 
(1) the procyclicality of the banking system, (2) systemic risk spillovers, and (3) 
the stock of noncore liabilities of the banking system. The core liabilities of a 
bank are its liabilities to the nonbank domestic creditors (such as through retail 
deposits). Then, the noncore liabilities of a bank are either a liability to another 
bank or a liability to a foreign creditor. This accounting identity nets out the 
claims and obligations between banks and describes only the total claims of ulti-
mate creditors on the ultimate debtors. The accounting identity is helpful in 
keeping track of the total credit to the private sector, and the total funding that 
is needed to support that credit. The systemic risks that result from the claims 
between banks will be addressed below separately.
The accounting identity above nets out the interbank claims, and so is not 
well-suited to identifying the risks from runs. Instead, the focus is on total 
credit that flows to the ultimate borrowers in the economy. If the concern is 
with “excessive” lending by banks (the quotes indicate we’re not giving a formal 
definition), then the accounting identity serves to draw attention to the role of 
noncore liabilities in funding the excessive lending.
As seen in Section 3, in a boom when credit is growing very rapidly, the 
growth of bank balance sheets outstrips the growth in the pool of retail deposits. 
As a result, the growth of bank lending results in greater lending and borrowing 
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between the intermediaries themselves, or results in the sucking in of foreign 
debt. To understand this point better, first, consider the simple case where 
there is no foreign creditor sector. In a boom when the assets of banks grow 
rapidly but the pool of retail deposits stays fixed, the proportion of banking sec-
tor liabilities in the form of retail deposits will fall. More generally, in the pres-
ence of a foreign creditor sector, the increase in bank lending will result in 
increased cross-lending between banks, but also will result in greater borrow-
ing from abroad. In this way, Shin and Shin (2011) argue that there are close 
conceptual links between procyclicality, systemic risk spillovers, and the stock 
of noncore liabilities of the banking system. The stage of the financial cycle is 
reflected in the composition of the liabilities of the banking sector.
The discussion so far suggests that the definition of core and noncore lia-
bilities should focus on whether the liability is to an ultimate domestic credi-
tor or not. In particular, Shin and Shin (2011) argue that we should distinguish 
between
1 liabilities due to an ultimate domestic creditor,
2 liabilities due to an intermediary, and
3 liabilities due to a foreign creditor.
The principle would be that (1) is classified as a core liability and (2) and (3) 
as noncore liabilities. In practice, however, the classification is not so clear-cut. 
For instance, the claims held by domestic nonfinancial firms share features of 
both core and noncore liabilities and are not easy to classify. For a small and 
medium-sized enterprise with an owner-manager, the bank deposits of that firm 
could be seen as household deposits. However, the firm could be a major firm 
with access to market finance, that can issue bonds and then deposit the pro-
ceeds of the bond sale in the banking system. This is what happened in Japan in 
the 1980s, for instance. This latter case should not be counted as a core liability, 
since the creditor firm is acting like an intermediary who borrows in the finan-
cial markets to lend to the banks.
For instance, as shown in Table 2, Shin and Shin (2011) suggest a two-way 
classification that takes account of the traditional concern with the liquidity of 
monetary aggregates together with the question of whether the liabilities are 
core or noncore. While acknowledging that some differences of views could lead 
to alternative classifications, they used the distinction to examine the case of 
Korea. For Korea, they define noncore liabilities as the sum of (1) bank liabili-
ties to foreign creditors (2) bank debt securities (3) promissory notes (4) repos 
and (5) certificates of deposit (CDs).8 This is the measure that was plotted ear-
lier in Figures 3 and 4.
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Note that this measure of noncore liabilities is an approximation of true 
noncore liabilities as the classification is still based upon financial instruments 
rather than actual claimholders. For instance, bank debt securities such as 
debentures and CDs can be held by households, and those must be excluded 
from the noncore liabilities. In Section 4.3 we conduct a more accurate analysis 
using information on claimholders of bank liabilities.
4.2. Empirical Properties of Bank Liability aggregates: The Case of Korea
Based on our accounting framework, we examine the empirical properties of 
core and noncore bank liability aggregates using Korean data. We construct 
more detailed measures of core and noncore liabilities by using information in 
the flow of funds data. While the measures used in Section 3 were suggestive, 
they were not rigorously formulated since we did not use the information about 
who holds the claim. In Korea, the flow of funds data report the financial flows 
across various sectors of the economy. Since this contains information about 
both assets and liabilities of each sector classified by detailed instruments, we 
can infer the information about who holds the claim. We obtained Korea’s flow 
of funds data from the Bank of Korea (http://ecos.bok.or.kr/).
4.2.1. Preliminary data analysis
For our study, we focus on the liabilities outstanding (i.e., stock measures) of 
depository financial corporations. The depository financial corporations include 
domestically licensed banks, specialized banks, foreign bank branches, bank 
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Source: Shin and Shin (2011).
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holding companies, and nonbank depository institutions such as bank trust 
accounts and credit unions. Hereafter, we simply refer to the depository finan-
cial corporations as banks. The data are quarterly (end of quarter) from 2002:Q4 
to 2010:Q1.9 Given our purpose of constructing core and noncore bank liabilities, 
we exclude equities, foreign direct investment, Bank of Korea (BOK) loans, ben-
eficiary certificates, and miscellaneous items from the total liabilities of banks.
Our bank liabilities data are classified by two dimensions: by instruments 
and by claimholders. First, in terms of instruments, bank liabilities are classi-
fied into seven broad categories: deposits; securities other than shares; loans; 
government loans; call loans and call money; financial derivatives; and other 
foreign debts. Other foreign debts are mainly foreign borrowings of domes-
tic banks and foreign bank branches located in Korea. Deposits are further 
classified into six subcategories: transferable and short-term deposits; long-
term savings deposits; cover bills; negotiable CDs; repurchase agreements 
RPs; and money in trust. Securities other than shares (hereafter securities) 
are further classified into three categories: financial debentures; commercial 
paper (CP); and external securities. Loans are further classified into four cate-
gories (excluding the BOK loans): depository corporation loans; insurance com-
pany loans; loans by credit-specialized financial institutions; and loans by public 
financial institutions. Second, the bank liabilities are classified into five catego-
ries depending upon who holds the claim: other financial corporations; nonfi-
nancial corporations; households; general government; and the foreign sector.
Figure 6 shows how bank liabilities classified by instrument evolved over 
time. In terms of size, deposits are the largest item, constituting over 70 per-
cent of total bank liabilities. The growth of most instruments other than depos-
its stagnated after the outbreak of global financial crisis in 2008. Note that 
three instruments in particular—securities, financial derivatives, and foreign 
debts—exhibit a much more pronounced rise and fall around the crisis.
Now we turn to the classification of bank liabilities by claimholder—namely 
by who holds the claim. The evolution over time of bank liabilities by claimhold-
ers in Korea is shown in Figure 7. Recall that in the previous section, we defined 
liabilities held by households or nonfinancial corporations as core liabilities and 
those held by financial corporations or by the foreign sector as noncore liabili-
ties. We see that both the liabilities held by financial corporations and liabilities 
held by the foreign sector increased rapidly before the crisis and then collapsed 
afterward. This is typical of the dynamics of noncore liabilities around financial 
crises. While foreigners had reduced their holdings at the end of 2008 and main-
tained their positions subsequently, financial institutions reduced their hold-
ings most dramatically after the first quarter of 2009. In contrast, the liabilities 
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held by households and by nonfinancial corporations increased steadily without 
much fluctuation around the crisis, which is a typical feature of core liabilities.10
During the boom, as bank lending increases, the liabilities also increase. 
Since core liabilities are quite stable, if total liabilities increase rapidly, then 
the increase must be mainly through the buildup of noncore liabilities, as shown 
above. Hence the financial cycle shows up in the composition of liabilities; the 
share of noncore liabilities increases rapidly before the crisis, only to collapse 
with the crisis.
Figure 8 exhibits the ratio of noncore to core bank liabilities. It is defined 
as the ratio of noncore liabilities held by financial corporations and the foreign 
sector to core liabilities held by households and nonfinancial corporations. The 
figure also illustrates the quarterly average exchange rate of the Korean won 
against the U.S. dollar. As foreign borrowings are a major source of noncore 
liabilities, changes in the noncore-to-core ratio are expected to be closely asso-
ciated with the movement of the exchange rate as discussed in the previous sec-
tion. Indeed, the figure shows that the peak of the noncore-to-core ratio was 
followed by a sudden plummet of the exchange rate.
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4.2.2. Procyclicality of bank liability aggregates
As discussed in Section 3, mitigating procyclicality is a key challenge for mac-
roprudential policies. However, for policymakers to apply any macropruden-
tial tools, it is necessary to monitor and identify the relevant stage of financial 
cycles. We hypothesize that the degree of financial procyclicality is amplified 
by the expansion and shrinkage of noncore liabilities. During the boom, when 
bank lending increases, liabilities also increase but all liabilities do not increase 
evenly. Namely noncore liabilities will be more procyclical than core liabilities.
To confirm this claim and estimate the responsiveness of bank liabilities 
over the business cycle, we rely on the simplest possible measure: the elastic-
ity of the liability with respect to real GDP. The elasticity of each liability i with 
respect to real GDP is calculated through regressions of the following form:
 ln( Lit) =b0+b1 ln( yt+x) ,x= –1, 0, 1. (1)
Here, Lit is bank liability i at date t, and i denotes core and noncore liabilities, 
respectively; yt+x is real GDP at date t+x, where x takes values x= –1, 0, 1. In 
the regression, the estimated value of b1 represents the elasticity of liability i 
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with respect to current real GDP (x= 0), lagged real GDP (x= –1), and lead real 
GDP (x=1).11
In Table 3 we present the estimated elasticity with respect to real GDP of 
core and noncore bank liabilities as classified by claimholders. As can be seen 
in the table, noncore liabilities provided by financial institutions and the foreign 
sector are much more procyclical than core liabilities held by households and 
nonfinancial firms. The real GDP elasticity of contemporaneous noncore liabili-
ties is estimated to be 4.26 while the real GDP elasticity of core liabilities is rel-
atively low at 1.74.12 The estimation results suggest that bank liabilities can be 
classified as core versus and noncore depending upon who holds the claim, and 
this classification well captures the differential degree of respective liabilities’ 
contribution to financial procyclicality.
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4.2.3. Responsiveness of bank liabilities to the policy interest rate
Given the positive results, we proceed to estimate the responsiveness of bank 
liabilities with respect to the stance of monetary policy as measured by Korea’s 
short-term policy interest rate, and investigate whether core and noncore lia-
bilities show a differential responsiveness. For instance, a permissive monetary 
policy environment and low interest rates may lead to amplification of financial 
cycles through expansion of short-term market-based borrowings. Further-
more, from the perspective of financial stability policy, for central banks to use 
monetary policy to lean against the excessive buildup of bank liabilities, a nec-
essary condition is that bank liabilities respond to the change in the policy inter-
est rate.
In this section, to examine this possibility, we estimate a semi-elasticity of 
bank liabilities with respect to the policy interest rate by modifying the equa-
tion as follows:
 ln( Lit) =b0+b1 ln( yt)+b2 it+x ,x= –1, 0, 1. (2)
Here, it+x is the domestic policy interest rate at time t+x. In the regression the 
estimated value of b2 represents a semi-elasticity of liability i with respect to 
the policy rate after controlling for the impact of real GDP.
Table 4 reports estimates of the semi-elasticity for the domestic policy inter-
est rate of core and noncore bank liabilities. Interestingly, the semi-elasticity of 
TaBLE   3 
Real gDp elasticity of Bank liabilities
	 Real	GDP	Elasticity	(02Q4–10Q1)
	 –1	 0	 1
Core liability 1.75*** 1.74*** 1.68*** 
 (11.25) (11.88) (11.51)
Noncore liability 4.36*** 4.26*** 4.28*** 
 (17.75) (14.99) (12.62)
Note: T-values are reported in parentheses and the statistical significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
TaBLE   4 
Domestic policy interest Rate semi-elasticity  
of Bank liabilities
	 Interest	Rate	Elasticity	(02Q4–10Q1)
	 –1	 0	 1
Core liability –3.88*** –5.13*** –5.55*** 
 (–3.29) (–6.08) (-8.83)
Noncore liability 4.25 –0.92 –5.99*** 
 (1.64) (–0.36) (–2.72)
Note: T-values are reported in parentheses and the statistical significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
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core liabilities with respect to the contemporaneous policy rate is –5.13, which 
is quite high and very significant, while the semi-elasticity of contemporaneous 
noncore liabilities is not statistically different from zero.13 While our regression 
results do not demonstrate any causal relationship, if we take the policy rate to 
be exogenous, the results suggest that domestic monetary policy may not be an 
effective macroprudential tool to lean against the excessive growth of noncore 
liabilities, while it may be able to contain core liabilities. This finding is consis-
tent with the discussion in Section 2 about the constraints on monetary policy 
placed on the central bank of a country with open capital accounts.
To explore the possibility of domestic bank liabilities being responsive to 
global liquidity shocks, we now replace the domestic policy rate with the foreign 
policy rate. For the foreign policy rate, we use the U.S. federal funds rate set 
by the Federal Reserve. Table 5 reports estimates of the semi-elasticity with 
respect to the U.S. policy rate of core and noncore bank liabilities. Since U.S. 
policy rates are exogenous to the Korean economy, these estimates are more 
likely to provide information about causality, and they are quite different from 
those when we use the domestic policy rate. The semi-elasticity of noncore bank 
liabilities with respect to the U.S. policy rate is negative and statistically signif-
icant. The semi-elasticity of noncore liabilities with respect to the current U.S. 
policy rate is –3.49 while the semi-elasticity of the core liabilities is –2.97.
Overall, we find that Korean banks’ noncore liabilities are much more neg-
atively related to the U.S. policy rate than to the domestic policy rate. One 
plausible interpretation is that, for emerging economies such as Korea, banks’ 
noncore liabilities tend to build up more vigorously when global liquidity condi-
tions are lax. For instance, when foreign interest rates are low, financial inter-
mediaries are more engaged in the carry trade of borrowing through the low 
foreign interest rate instruments and investing in higher domestic interest rate 
instruments. This carry trade leads to more foreign borrowing and thus larger 
bank liabilities held by the foreign sector.
TaBLE   5 
U.s. policy interest Rate semi-elasticity of Bank liabilities
	 US	Fed	Fund	Rate	Elasticity	(02Q4–10Q1)
	 –1	 0	 1
Core liability –3.14*** –2.97*** –2.55*** 
 (–8.30) (–8.09) (–5.99)
Noncore liability –2.74*** –3.49*** –4.43*** 
 (–2.12) (–3.08) (–4.55)
Note: T-values are reported in parentheses and the statistical significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
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The intermediaries with more funding from foreign sources are capable of 
lending to other intermediaries as well as to ultimate borrowers. Hence, bank 
liabilities held by other financial corporations also increase. Since these two 
noncore liabilities, held by the foreign sector and by financial corporations, are 
the major source of rapid accumulation of bank liabilities, it is not surprising 
to see that the foreign interest rate plays such an important role in emerging 
market countries such as Korea. If the negative relationship between bank lia-
bilities and the U.S. policy rate can be interpreted to reflect a causal relation-
ship, our results suggest that accumulation of Korean noncore bank liabilities is 
much more affected by the U.S. policy rate than the domestic policy rate. This 
implies that there is not much scope for domestic monetary policy to play in con-
trolling bank liabilities for prudential purposes.
In Section 3 we referred to a recent empirical study by Kim and Shin (2010) 
that shows how Korean monetary policy is dependent on U.S. monetary policy 
even after Korea officially adopted a floating exchange rate policy. This fact is 
clearly reflected in Figure 2, where we observed that the Korean policy rate fol-
lows the U.S. policy rate very closely with a few months lag.
Our finding in Table 4 that the lead of the domestic policy rate in Korea is 
more negatively related to bank noncore liabilities than either contemporane-
ous or lagged rates can also be understood by the fact that Korea’s domestic 
monetary policy follows the U.S. policy rate with a lag. Since future domestic 
monetary policy is more or less similar to current U.S. monetary policy, if bank 
liabilities respond to current U.S. monetary policy, the semi-elasticity of bank 
liabilities will be more correlated to the lead of the domestic policy interest rate.
Overall, our results confirm that the accumulation of noncore bank liabil-
ities in Korea is more affected by the U.S. policy rate than by the domestic 
Korean policy rate. This finding strongly suggests that monetary policy has 
cross-border spillover effects and that the stages of the domestic financial cycle 
and thus the buildup of financial risks cannot effectively be addressed solely by 
monitoring domestic monetary policies in emerging economies.
5. macroprudential policy Frameworks
Our finding in the previous section suggests that central banks in open emerg-
ing economies, even when they have a flexible exchange rate regime, may want 
tools beyond the traditional policy interest rate to respond preemptively to the 
buildup of financial risks. A macroprudential policy framework is necessary to 
complement monetary policy in this respect. This framework should encom-
pass a system of early warning indicators that signal increased vulnerabilities 
to financial stability and a set of associated policy tools that can address the 
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increased vulnerabilities at an early stage. The surveys by the Bank of Eng-
land (2009) and Bank for International Settlements (BIS 2010) give useful tax-
onomies. Hanson, Kashyap, and Stein (2011) provide further empirical context 
and support.
5.1. Macroprudential Indicators
Excessive asset growth of the banking sector is at the core of increased finan-
cial sector vulnerabilities. The challenge for policymakers is knowing when 
asset growth is “excessive” and finding policy tools that can address and coun-
ter the excessive asset growth in a timely and effective manner.
Simple rules of thumb such as the ratio of total credit to GDP may be useful, 
as demonstrated by Borio and Lowe (2004). This ratio has figured prominently 
in the discussion of the countercyclical capital buffer under the Basel III frame-
work, which proposes a buffer focused on the credit to GDP ratio as the measure 
of procyclicality that would trigger increased capital requirements on banks 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2009). The idea that the required 
capital buffer would vary with the financial cycle had been in existence for some 
time and had been argued in the Geneva Report on bank regulation (Brunner-
meier et al. 2009), but the Basel Committee’s approach went one step further in 
selecting the credit to GDP ratio as the appropriate cyclical indicator.
It is natural that credit growth should be scaled by normalizing it relative to 
some underlying fundamental measure. Normalizing credit growth by GDP has 
many advantages, since GDP is an aggregate flow measure of economic activ-
ity that reflects current economic conditions. However, more controversial is the 
choice of the measure of credit growth itself, especially if such a choice entails 
decisions that are made on a discretionary basis by the relevant authority that 
is in charge of banking sector oversight.
Further research will be necessary to determine to what extent the simple 
credit to GDP ratio can serve as a finely calibrated signal that can support the 
use of automatic tightening of bank capital standards, as envisaged in the Basel 
III framework.
Edge and Meisenzahl (2011) argue that using the credit to GDP ratio in 
real time as a guide to policy may be fraught with difficulties due to measure-
ment problems. They identify two types of measurement issues—the first deal-
ing with the underlying components of GDP that may subsequently be revised, 
and the second dealing with the difficulties of estimating the gap between the 
current realization and the trend. Since the trend itself must be measured in 
real time, the gap measure turns out to be highly sensitive to measurement 
problems.
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It would be uncontroversial to say that the less unanimity there is in the 
interpretation of the signal, the greater will be the political economy challenges 
faced by policymakers in acting decisively and in a timely fashion to head off 
financial booms that build up vulnerabilities. Therefore, the use of the credit to 
GDP ratio in real-time policy can be expected to present formidable challenges.
Given the potential difficulties of using the simple credit to GDP ratio as the 
appropriate signal of the stage of the financial cycle, alternatives may be pref-
erable. Following from our discussion in previous sections, a more promising 
set of measures of the financial cycle are those derived from the liabilities side 
of banking-sector balance sheets. In particular, the growth of various compo-
nents of noncore to core liabilities of the banking sector may be especially use-
ful in gauging the stage of the financial cycle.
Although balance sheet aggregates are forms of monetary aggregates and 
liability measures of the banking sector, there are important distinctions with 
the traditional approach to monetary analysis. Traditional monetary aggre-
gates have been examined by monetary economists for their effect on future 
inflation through the quantity theory of money. The recent lengthy study by the 
ECB (Papademos and Stark 2010) is a comprehensive survey of the traditional 
approach to the study of monetary aggregates.
However, the macroprudential role of monetary aggregates depends on the 
behavioral and stability properties of such aggregates. As we have seen, the 
legal form of the claim may not coincide with the behavioral properties of the 
claim. For instance, we have seen that household deposits have empirical traits 
that differ from deposits held by other types of owners, even though the legal 
form of the claims is identical.
In particular, we have shown that a two-dimensional classification of bank 
liabilities in terms of (1) the holder of the claim and (2) the type of claim provides 
a much richer texture to the overall picture of banking-sector fluctuations. Fur-
ther refinements of this two-way classification and further explorations of the 
predictive properties of the noncore liability aggregates for financial spreads 
and exchange rate changes may shed light on the optimal set of indicators.
Measures of cross-exposures across intermediaries (such as the conditional 
value at risk (CoVaR) measure due to Adrian and Brunnermeier 2009) may be 
useful complementary indicators, bearing in mind that cross-exposures them-
selves are procyclical, and track noncore liabilities. The study of cross-expo-
sures across financial institutions is still in its infancy, but there has been a 
growth in interest on this issue, especially from researchers in central banks 
from those advanced economies that were on the front line of the financial dis-
tress during the recent financial crisis.
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Among advanced economy central banks, the Bank of England has been one 
of the most active in research into the systemic risk generated by cross-expo-
sures between financial intermediaries. In November 2009, the Bank of Eng-
land published a discussion paper on the role of macroprudential policy (Bank 
of England 2009). The report reflects the issues and policy concerns that reflect 
the country’s experience with the failure of Northern Rock bank and the subse-
quent intervention and resolution in the U.K. banking system. Although there is 
some gap between the concerns of an advanced economy and those of an emerg-
ing economy, many of the lessons on excessive asset growth and the growth of 
volatile market-based liabilities are common themes.
The Bank for International Settlements, especially its Committee for the 
Global Financial System (CGFS) has also conducted extensive study of the role 
of macroprudential policy. The CGFS published a discussion paper in May 2010 
that gives an overview of the instruments and frameworks of macroprudential 
policies.
5.2. Macroprudential Tools
Macroprudential policy tools to mitigate vulnerabilities ideally would be 
designed to fit closely with the early warning indicators and the conceptual 
underpinnings for the relevant economic externalities. We proceed to outline 
the variety of tools that have been used or proposed, but we do not attempt to 
construct an encompassing framework that can gauge the trade-offs in a sys-
tematic way. A promising approach in providing a more systematic framework 
is given by Goodhart et al. (2012) who examine a micro-founded general equilib-
rium model with default.
Examples of macroprudential policy tools include the following:
5.2.1. Loan-to-value and debt service-to-income caps
When monetary policy is constrained, administrative rules that limit bank lend-
ing such as caps on LTV and DTI ratios may be a useful complement to tradi-
tional tools in banking supervision. Although LTV ratios are more familiar to 
financial regulators, the use of DTI caps is less widespread. However, for Korea 
and some Asian economies such as Hong Kong, the use of DTI ratios has been 
an important supplementary tool for macroprudential purposes. In the case of 
Hong Kong, the use of DTI rules takes on added significance because Hong 
Kong has a currency board based on the U.S. dollar, and hence does not have an 
autonomous monetary policy. As such, monetary policy shocks are transmitted 
directly to Hong Kong. The flexible use of LTV and DTI rules are key elements 
of the macroprudential toolkit.
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5.2.2. Capital requirements that adjust over the cycle
Research has shown that the rise in asset values that accompanies a boom 
results in higher capital buffers at financial institutions, supporting further 
lending in the context of an unchanging benchmark for capital adequacy; in 
the bust, the value of this capital can drop precipitously, possibly even necessi-
tating a cut in lending.14 Capital requirements as currently constituted there-
fore can amplify the credit cycle, making a boom and bust more likely. Capital 
requirements that, instead, lean against the credit or business cycle, that rise 
with credit growth and fall with credit contraction, can thus play an important 
role in promoting financial stability and reducing systemic risk. Research on 
how to design such cyclical capital requirements needs to be a high priority for 
both academia and central banks.
We have already commented on some of the measurement issues associated 
with implementing countercyclical capital buffers. The framework for counter-
cyclical capital buffers as envisaged in the Basel III framework has focused on 
the ratio of credit growth to GDP. There are two preconditions for successful 
implementation of such countercyclical measures. First, the quantitative sig-
nals that trigger actions should accurately reflect the features (such as exces-
sive asset growth) that are being targeted by policymakers. Second, the 
implementation procedure should work better if it allows policymakers to move 
decisively and in a timely manner to head off the buildup of vulnerabilities. We 
have already commented on the first point, so here we focus on the second point.
If triggering countercyclical capital requirements is predicated on the exer-
cise of discretion and judgment by the authorities, the political economy prob-
lems associated with the exercise of such discretion put the authorities under 
pressure from market participants and other interested parties. The political 
economy problem is similar to that of central banks that tighten monetary pol-
icy to head off property booms. Since there are private-sector participants who 
are the beneficiaries of the short-term boom, they can be expected to exert 
pressure against policymakers. The political economy problems will be more 
acute if there are controversies on the correctness or accuracy of the quantita-
tive indicators used by the authorities.
Thus, the two issues mentioned above—the accuracy of the quantitative 
indicators and the political economy problems—are in fact very closely related. 
One of the disadvantages of the countercyclical capital buffer is that it relies on 
triggering additional capital requirements in response to quantitative signals. 
Although such quantitative measures are relatively straightforward in simple 
theoretical models, there may be considerable challenges to smooth and deci-
sive implementation in practice.
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5.2.3. Forward-looking provisioning
Forward-looking provisioning operates in a similar manner to the countercy-
clical capital requirements discussed earlier, although there are also important 
differences. The Bank of Spain has pioneered the use of forward-looking (or 
dynamic) provisioning. A good early reference to the specific rules and proce-
dures as well as the empirical studies that underpin the specific quantitative 
features of the scheme is given in Fernandez, Pages and Saurina (2000). A more 
recent update is provided by Saurina (2009) in a World Bank note.
Forward-looking provisioning requires building up a loss-absorbing buffer 
in the form of provisions at the time of making the loan. In this sense, there is a 
similarity with the countercyclical capital buffer. However, the main difference 
between forward-looking provisioning and the countercyclical capital require-
ment is the accounting treatment. In the case of forward-looking provisioning, 
the provision passes through the income statement as reduced profit, and hence 
affects the capital of the bank. By influencing the capital of the bank it is likely 
to influence bank management that targets a specific return on equity figure.
Although forward-looking provisioning has been important in cushioning 
the Spanish banking system from the initial stages of the global financial cri-
sis, there is a question mark on whether building up loss-absorbing buffers, by 
itself, can be sufficient to cushion the economy from the bursting of a major 
property bubble, as Spain is discovering its cost during the ongoing European 
financial crisis.
5.2.4. Leverage caps and loan-to-deposit caps
Caps on bank leverage may be used as a way to limit asset growth by tying total 
assets to bank equity.15 The rationale for a leverage cap rests on the role of bank 
capital as a constraint on new lending rather than the Basel approach of bank 
capital as a buffer against loss.
In June 2010, Korean regulatory authorities introduced a new set of macro-
prudential regulations to mitigate the excessive volatility of foreign capital flows. 
Specific policy measures included explicit ceilings on foreign exchange deriva-
tive positions of banks, regulations on foreign currency bank loans, and pruden-
tial regulations for improving foreign exchange risk management of financial 
institutions. These policy measures are to limit short-term foreign currency 
denominated borrowings of banks. Along with these regulations, short-term 
external debts of Korean banks have remained at approximately US$200 billion 
level since early 2009, which is much less than the US$250 billion at the peak in 
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2008. Note that foreign borrowing is a key noncore funding source for Korean 
banks, and reining in foreign borrowing has also contributed to the deleverag-
ing of bank noncore liabilities.
Korea’s leverage cap on bank foreign exchange derivative positions intro-
duced in June 2010 is aimed at limiting the practice of banks hedging forward 
dollar positions with carry trade positions in Korean won funded with short-
term U.S. dollar debt. The leverage cap has moderated carry trade capital 
inflows into Korea, but the primary rationale of the leverage cap is as a mac-
roprudential measure aimed at financial stability rather than as a capital con-
trol tool.
Another related measure that is in place in Korea is the cap on the ratio of 
loans to deposits. The Korean supervisory authority announced in December 
2009 that it will reintroduce the loan-to-deposit ratio regulation which had been 
scrapped in November 1998 as a part of the government deregulation efforts. 
According to the new regulation, Korean won-denominated loans must be less 
than 100 percent of Korean won-denominated deposits, with negotiable CDs not 
being counted as deposits in computing the ratio. The 100 percent ceiling must 
be met by Korean banks by the end of 2013. As can be seen in Figure 9, the 
loan-to-value ratio of Korean banks continued to fall after this announcement 
as banks shifted their funding structure away from wholesale funding through 
CDs and bank debentures towards taking deposits such as time deposits.
However, the rule does not apply to the Korean branches of foreign banks. 
By capping the growth of lending to the same pace as the growth of deposit 
funding, the Korean loan to deposit cap has two effects. First, it restrains exces-
sive asset growth by tying loan growth to the growth in deposit funding. Sec-
ond, it has a direct effect on the growth of noncore liabilities, and hence on the 
buildup of vulnerabilities that come from the liabilities side of the balance sheet. 
In this respect, there are similarities between the loan-to-deposit cap and the 
levy on noncore liabilities, to be discussed later.
Indeed, at the theoretical level the loan-to-deposit cap can be seen as a spe-
cial case of a noncore liabilities levy where the tax rate is kinked, changing 
from zero to infinity at the threshold point. However, the comparison with the 
noncore liabilities levy is less easy because the loan-to-deposit cap applies only 
to loans, not total assets or total exposures (including off-balance-sheet expo-
sures). Also, the fact that the loan-to-deposit cap does not apply to the Korean 
branches of foreign banks means that there are limits on what might be achieved 
in reining in excesses during booms.
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5.2.5. Levy on noncore liabilities
The stock of noncore liabilities reflects the stage of the financial cycle and the 
extent of the underpricing of risk in the financial system. A levy or tax on non-
core liabilities can serve to mitigate pricing distortions that lead to excessive 
asset growth. The Financial Stability Contribution (FSC) recommended by the 
IMF in its report on bank levies16 to the G-20 leaders is an example of such a cor-
rective tax. Korea announced its Macroprudential Levy in December 2010, and 
began operation in August 2011. This levy is applied to the foreign exchange-
denominated liabilities of the banking sector, with the rate initially set at 20 
basis points for short-term foreign exchange-denominated liabilities.
A levy on noncore liabilities has many desirable features. First, the base 
of the levy itself varies over the financial cycle. The levy bites hardest during 
the boom when noncore liabilities are large, so that the levy has the proper-
ties of an automatic stabilizer even if the tax rate itself remains constant over 
Source: Korea Financial Supervisory Service.
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time. Given the well-known political economy challenges to the exercise of dis-
cretion by regulators, the automatic stabilizer feature of the levy has important 
advantages.
Second, a levy on noncore liabilities addresses financial vulnerability while 
leaving unaffected the essential functioning of the financial system in channel-
ing core funding from savers to borrowers. By targeting noncore liabilities only, 
the levy addresses externalities associated with excessive asset growth and 
systemic risk arising from interconnectedness of banks.
Third, the targeting of noncore liabilities addresses the vulnerability of 
open emerging economies to sudden reversals in capital flows due to delever-
aging by banks. Indeed, for emerging economies, a levy on noncore liabilities 
could be aimed more narrowly at the foreign currency-denominated liabilities 
only. A levy on the foreign exchange liabilities of the banking sector will have 
an impact on foreign currency flows, but such a policy is best characterized as 
a macroprudential tool aimed at financial stability, rather than a tool for capital 
controls or a tool to manage the exchange rate.
The revenue raised by the levy is a secondary issue. The main purpose of 
the levy is to align incentives. A good analogy is with the congestion charge 
used to control car traffic into central London. Under this charge, car driv-
ers pay a daily fee of £8 to drive into central London. The main purpose of 
the charge is to discourage drivers from bringing their cars into central Lon-
don, thereby alleviating the externalities associated with traffic congestion. In 
the same way, the noncore liabilities bank levy can be seen primarily as a tool 
for aligning the incentives of banks closer to the social optimum. The revenue 
raised by the levy would also be of benefit (perhaps for a market stabilization 
fund) but the revenue is a secondary issue.
5.2.6. Unremunerated reserve requirements
A traditional form of capital controls has been unremunerated reserve require-
ments, where the central bank requires importers of capital to deposit a certain 
fraction of these inflows at the central bank. The deposit does not pay inter-
est, and so the requirement constitutes a tax on the capital inflow. In Korea, 
a reserve requirement for deposits is already in place, but there is no simi-
lar reserve requirement for nondeposit liabilities. The introduction of a reserve 
requirement for the nondeposit liabilities of banks would raise the cost of nonde-
posit funding for banks and thereby restrain the rapid growth of such liabilities 
during booms. In this respect, a reserve requirement on nondeposit liabilities 
would have a similar effect to a tax or levy on such liabilities.
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However, there are also important differences. The reserves would have to 
be held on the central bank’s balance sheet, with implications for fluctuations in 
the money supply in line with the private sector’s use of nondeposit liabilities, 
and the selection of counterpart assets on the central bank’s balance sheet.
There are also differences in the revenue implications between a reserve 
requirement and a levy on bank liabilities. The reserve requirement would raise 
revenue to the extent that the net income on the assets held by the central bank 
that is funded by the reserves would be positive. The bigger the interest spread, 
the larger the income.
There is one advantage of the reserve requirement that is not shared by the 
levy, which is that the banks would have access to a liquid asset in case there is 
a liquidity shortage or run in the financial market. In this respect, the reserve 
requirement would have some of the features of the Basel III liquidity require-
ment on banks.
However, a disadvantage of the reserve requirement is that it applies only 
to banks, rather than to the wider group of financial institutions that use non-
core liabilities. When faced with the possibility of arbitrage, or with structural 
changes that shift intermediation activity from banks to market-based finan-
cial intermediaries, the reserve requirement would be less effective. For Korea, 
this problem is less acute under the current market structure, but the endoge-
nous evolution of market structure cannot be ruled out.
6. Concluding Remarks
The global financial crisis has spurred a fundamental review of the principles of 
prudential regulation. While microprudential regulations with the objective of 
strengthening individual financial institutions will have some beneficial effects 
on strengthening the resilience of the financial system as a whole, such a firm-
specific approach has been demonstrated as being insufficient to ensure finan-
cial stability. Broader measures to strengthen systems as a whole and reduce 
the buildup of risks over time are also needed.
The centerpiece of Basel III is a strengthened common equity buffer of 
7 percent together with newly introduced liquidity requirements and a lever-
age cap, to be phased in over an extended timetable running to 2019. However, 
the elements that were most promising in living up to the macroprudential aims 
of regulatory reform—the countercyclical capital buffer and the capital sur-
charge for the systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs)—proved 
most controversial.
In the case of the countercyclical capital buffer, disagreements between coun-
tries meant that the countercyclical buffer will be introduced at the discretion 
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of national regulators in the range of 0 to 2.5 percent. In other words, there has 
been a failure to agree on a uniform international standard for counter cyclical 
capital. In the case of the additional restrictions against SIFIs, the G-20 sum-
mit in Seoul in November 2010 pointed to a varied approach where individual 
country regulators will select policies from a large menu that includes contin-
gent capital, leverage caps, or levies.
Thus, under its common denominator that excludes countercyclical capital 
or SIFI surcharges, Basel III is almost exclusively micro-prudential in its focus, 
concerned with the solvency of individual banks, rather than being macro-pru-
dential, concerned with the resilience of the financial system as a whole.
The language of Basel III is revealing in this regard, with repeated refer-
ences to greater “loss absorbency” of bank capital. However, we have argued in 
this paper that achieving greater loss absorbency by itself is almost certainly 
inadequate in achieving a stable financial system, for the following reasons:
•   Loss absorbency does not address directly excessive asset growth dur-
ing booms.
•   Preoccupation with  loss absorbency diverts attention  from the  liabili-
ties side of bank balance sheets and vulnerabilities from the reliance on 
unstable short-term funding and short-term foreign currency debt.
In this paper, we have given an overview of the policy options that can com-
plement traditional tools of bank regulation and the tools of monetary policy in 
reining in the excesses in the financial system. Macroprudential policies aim to 
constrain excessive growth in lending during booms, and thereby attain both 
a more viable long-term growth in lending and also mitigate the emergence of 
vulnerabilities on the liabilities side. The current global conjuncture with global 
liquidity driven by expansive monetary policies pursued by advanced economy 
central banks makes the topic of macroprudential policies in emerging market 
economies even more important and pressing than usual. Although the study of 
macroprudential policy frameworks is in its infancy, there is a quickly accumu-
lating body of work on the subject. We hope that this study makes a contribu-
tion in this direction.
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NOTES
1 This section draws heavily on Mishkin (2011a).
2 One element of monetary policy strategy before the crisis not discussed here is gradu-
alism, in which policy interest rates display a substantial amount of inertia (see Mishkin 
2010a). Gradualism is not discussed here because it is not as central to the discussion of mac-
roprudential policies.
3 The rationale for a flexible inflation targeting framework was provided by nine basic prin-
ciples derived from the science of monetary policy and which have become known as the new 
neoclassical synthesis (Goodfriend and King 1997). These nine principles, which are dis-
cussed in detail in Mishkin (2011a) are: (1) inflation is always and everywhere a monetary 
phenomenon; (2) price stability has important benefits; (3) there is no long-run trade-off 
between unemployment and inflation; (4) expectations play a crucial role in the determina-
tion of inflation and in the transmission of monetary policy to the macroeconomy; (5) real 
interest rates need to rise with higher inflation, i.e., the Taylor principle; (6) monetary policy 
is subject to the time-inconsistency problem; (7) central bank independence helps improve 
the efficiency of monetary policy; (8) commitment to a strong nominal anchor is central to 
producing good monetary policy outcomes; and (9) financial frictions play an important role 
in business cycles.
4 Since the writing of this study, the Federal Reserve announced a 2 percent target in a Jan-
uary 25, 2012, statement.
5 There are two other lessons, not discussed here that are relevant to whether monetary 
policy changes should exhibit gradualism (see Mishkin 2011a): The macroeconomy is highly 
nonlinear, and the zero lower bound for policy rates is more problematic then previously 
recognized. They are not discussed here because our study focuses less on monetary pol-
icy issues.
6 Even though objections to the LSAP program on the basis that it would produce a credit 
bubble are currently not justified, there are features of this program that do raise legitimate 
concerns (see Mishkin 2010b).
7 Indeed, central banks that continue to give some attention to monetary aggregates have 
emphasized the financial stability properties of monetary aggregates for this reason. For 
instance, the ECB has shifted in recent years to interpreting their monetary pillar increas-
ingly as a financial stability pillar. Indeed, the ECB has published a comprehensive and in-
depth study of the role of monetary aggregates in the economy (Papademos and Stark 2010). 
The ECB study, which runs almost 600 pages, covers both the traditional roles of money in 
the quantity theory of money (and hence on inflation), as well as the more recent attention to 
the role of monetary aggregates in financial stability issues.
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8 The inclusion of CDs in noncore liabilities is motivated by the fact that CDs are often held 
by financial institutions engaged in the carry trade, who use CDs as an alternative to hold-
ing Korean government securities in their transactions.
9 The data begin from 2002:Q4 due to the substantial revision of the data collection method 
following the 1993 System of National Accounts (93 SNA). Before 2002:Q4, no data are 
reported according to the new 93 SNA and no separate accounts exist for different types of 
financial corporations. Another advantage of using 93 SNA data is that it reports gross lia-
bility data within each sector without netting cross-transactions within the sector, which is 
more appropriate to capture the expansion and shrinkage of the balance sheet of financial 
institutions.
10 In the fuller version of our paper, we also conducted detailed analyses of liabilities held by 
different claimholders for respective instrument categories. We find that even at the deposit 
level, those deposits held by financial corporations show the typical dynamics of noncore lia-
bilities, and that the securities held by households show the typical pattern of core liabili-
ties. These findings suggest that the classification of bank liabilities by claimholders should 
be more informative for the purpose of macroprudential policy analysis.
11 In this regression, both regressor and regressand may be subject to a nonstationarity 
problem. In particular, it is well-known that if both variables are nonstationary, this type of 
regression is vulnerable to a spurious estimation. However, since our objective is to measure 
the percentage change of the liability in response to a 1 percent change in real GDP, esti-
mating b1 in this double log form is the right way to proceed. For a robustness check, how-
ever, we detrended both the regressor and regressand by the Hodrick-Prescott filter and 
obtained qualitatively similar results.
12 We also conducted more detailed analyses to estimate real GDP elasticities of respective 
bank liabilities classified by instruments and claimholders. We find that, when classified by 
instruments, the elasticity estimates for securities, financial derivatives, and foreign claims 
are relatively high. When classified by claimholders, elasticity measures for financial corpo-
rate and foreign sector are much higher. These results are available upon request.
13 Quite interestingly, only the lead policy rate is statistically significant with a negative 
sign. We will revisit and discuss this issue.
14 For example, see Kashyap and Stein (1994) and Adrian and Shin (2009).
15 Morris and Shin (2008).
16 IMF (2010).
